Although robust evidence indicates that action initiation can occur unconsciously and unintentionally, the literature on action inhibition suggests that inhibition requires both conscious thought and intentionality. In prior research demonstrating automatic inhibition in response to unconsciously processed stimuli, the unconscious stimuli had previously been consciously associated with an inhibitory response within the context of the experiment, and participants had consciously formed a goal to activate inhibition processes when presented with the stimuli (because task instructions required participants to engage in inhibition when the stimuli occurred). Therefore, prior work suggests that some amount of conscious thought and intentionality are required for inhibitory control. In the present research, we recorded event-related potentials during two go/no-go experiments in which participants were subliminally primed with general action/inaction concepts that had never been consciously associated with task-specific responses. We provide the first demonstration that inhibitory control processes can be modulated completely unconsciously and unintentionally.
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Introduction
Are you in control of your own behavior? A large body of evidence suggests that actions can be initiated unconsciously (Libet, 1985) and unintentionally (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001) , which calls into question the concept of free will and the plausibility of complete conscious control over behavior (cf., Newell & Shanks, in press). However, behavioral control is more than mere action initiation -many critical aspects of behavioral control involve inhibiting (rather than executing) actions. Weight loss, smoking cessation, emotion regulation, and saving money all involve the use of inhibitory control over actions that would otherwise occur (i.e., eating, smoking, emoting, and spending, respectively). According to several influential theories, nonconscious behaviors are relatively inflexible and primarily involve the reproduction of well-learned associations (Bargh, 1990; Kruglanski et al., 2002) . Thus, an over-eater's automatic reaction to perceiving food is the desire to eat, a smoker's automatic reaction to perceiving a cigarette is the desire to smoke, and so forth. An important question, then, is whether conscious thought is necessary to engage inhibitory control processes that can override actions when they are initiated, or whether inhibitory processes can also be initiated unconsciously and unintentionally.
Recently, a number of studies have demonstrated that subliminal stimuli can unconsciously activate inhibition processes. However, the stimuli in these studies unconsciously activate inhibitory processes only after the stimuli have already been consciously associated with task-spe-0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.04.012
